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Esposito: The Anamag Decision: an Illustration of Legislative Inadequacy

NOTE

THE ANAMAG DECISION: AN
ILLUSTRATION OF LEGISLATIVE
INADEQUACY
The National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") recent decision in the petition of Anamag and International Union of Electrical, Technical, Salaried& Machine Workers" held that 'team lead-

ers' are not supervisors' under section 2(11) of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA").3 The Anamag facility utilizes a Japanese4
managerial philosophy commonly referred to as the "team concept."
This managerial system is becoming quite popular in the United
States and has had tremendous success in a number of industries.5
1. 284 N.LR.B. No. 72 (1987).
2. A supervisor is any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not
merely routine or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. 29 U.S.C. §
152(11) (1982).
3. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended by 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
4. 284 N.L.R.B. No. 72 at 2.
5. Holstein & Engardio, The Difference Japanese Management Makes, Bus. WK., July
14, 1986 at 47. The invasion of the Japanese capitol and managerial techniques promises to be
one of the most important economic forces reshaping America as the century concludes. Japanese companies are establishing themselves in the steel, electronics, telecommunications and
most heavily, in the automobile industry in the United States.
The Japanese managerial philosophy is that of a "hands-on" approach as opposed to the
passive approach of most United States companies. The Japanese use a "flexible assembly
line" operated by teams of workers who supervise themselves. This flexible assembly line system gives the workers, or "team members" as they are called, tremendous input into produc-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1988

1

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 7
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 6:1

It is the intent of this Note to illustrate the inconsistency between the NLRA, primarily the Taft-Hartley amendments and the
supervisory exclusion, and the case law, which is designed to effectuate the Act's policies. The Anamag decision serves to illustrate this
inconsistency which creates a complex dilemma to an already problematic area of labor law. 6
THE HISTORY AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT OF THE
THE TAFT-HARTLEY AMENDMENTS

NLRA

AND

In the early portion of the twentieth century, conditions existed
which adversely affected the free flow of commerce in the United
States.7 The common worker was helpless against the employer due
to a lack of bargaining power.8 As a result, employers treated their
workers unfairly, most notably, depressing the worker's wage.' These
conditions existed due to a lack of government intervention in the
labor-management relationship. 10
tion decisions which are, by United States' standards, managerial in nature. Team members
are trained for several assembly line posts so that "flexibility" is at a maximum. This technique keeps the line running smoothly and efficiently. Any team member can stop the assembly
line at any time at their discretion. This allows the workers to catch mistakes which adds to
the higher quality product as a whole.
Japanese management work together in the plant with the employees and their relationship is based on mutual trust. The Japanese have gained the trust of the American worker by
allowing them some "hands-on" control over their own plant and product and by treating them
as equals. Japanese executives are not given privileged parking lots. They eat with the assembly line workers in the employee cafeteria. They wear the same overalls as the employees and
work at desks on the plant floor, without offices. In short, the Japanese make the worker feel
important. This brings a better attitude to the worker and in the end, a better product to the
company.
This managerial philosophy has had its biggest success in the Fremont, California plant of
General Motors. Fremont had a daily absentee rate of over 20% and usually had about 5,000
grievances outstanding. Production was constantly being interrupted by wildcat strikes. General Motors shut the plant down in 1982. Later through a joint venture with Toyota, General
Motors reopened the plant. Upon reopening, General Motors utilized a Japanese managerial
system. The Japanese, using the same basic equipment and technology, turned the plant
around. The absentee rate decreased to under 2% and the outstanding grievances were reduced to two. The Japanese managerial technique also allowed the plant to produce the same
amount of cars with half the amount of employees. In short, the Japanese managerial philosophy and technique have produced great results in the United States and its use is on the rise.
Id. at 45-50.
6. GAF Corp. v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1975). The Court called the determination of a supervisor to be "[tlhe aging but nevertheless persistently vexing problem." Id. at
493.
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
8. A. Cox, D. Bok, & R. Gorman, Labor Law (5th ed. 1986) at 5.
9. id.
10. Congress did pass the Clayton Act in 1914 to protect labor unions from the scope of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890. Although this was the intent of the Clayton Act, the
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Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 to
combat the pressing problem of labor-management relations.,, The
NLRA's basic policies were the encouragement of unionization and
collective bargaining. 2 The encouragement of unionization was the
government's solution to the depression of wages." The use of collective bargaining was the government's solution to the tense relationship between labor and management. 4 Congress believed that unionization and collective bargaining would lead to the free flow of
15
commerce.
The NLRA was a major victory for the union movement and
was bitterly opposed by labor management. 16 The NLRA paved the
way for strong unionization of employees, not only in the face of
management, but at management's expense.' 7 The employers were
blamed by the government for inducing the workers to strike and
were condemned for the overall condition of unrest between labor
and management. "The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure
of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial
strife and unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce ...

."18 The NLRA gave the

employees the express right to organize and to form labor organizations which would act as their collective bargaining agent against the
employer.' 9 The NLRA set out several proscribed acts, known as
courts accepted a very narrow interpretation of its policy. This narrow interpretation allowed
management to seek injunctions against striking workers as per the "means" and "objectives"

test set forth in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). Additionally,
under the Clayton Act, management, not just the Attorney General could seek an injunction.
Therefore, the intended effect of the Clayton Act was never fully realized.
The federal government then passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. This statute re-

stricted the jurisdiction of the United States courts to grant injunctions against labor unions
involved in labor disputes. Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act was effective, it did very little

in helping the work force achieve many of its objectives concerning the actual working conditions of their employment contracts. A. Cox, D. Bok, & R. Gorman, supra note 8, at 48-60.
11.

See 29 U.S.C. § 151.

12.

A. Cox, D. Bok, & R. Gorman, supra note 8, at 89.

13. Wollett, Collective Bargaining,Public Policy, and the National Labor Relations
Act of 1947, 23 WAsH. L. REv. 209 (1948).
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
16. A. Cox, D. Bok, & R. Gorman, supra note 8, at 89.

17.

Id. at 90.

18.
19.

29 U.S.C. § 151.
29 U.S.C. § 157. "Employees shall have the right of self organization, to form, join,

or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other

mutual aid or protection . ...Id.
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unfair labor practices, from which the employer must refrain or be
held liable.20 The policy of the NLRA's unfair labor practices was to
preserve the right of the workers to organize and be free of employer
interference and coercion which had impeded labor organizations in
the past.21 In no section of the NLRA of 1935 will one find any
unfair labor practices on part of labor organizations. There was no
proscribed conduct on the part of labor organizations.
THE TAFT-HARTLEY AMENDMENTS OF

1947

The NLRA was a major turning point in the progression of the
labor movement nationwide. The impending war in Europe and the
actual outbreak of World War II also added tremendous power to
the union movement.22 The critical need for labor caused unions to
solidify and strengthen. 23 By the mid 1940's, however, labor unions
had become too powerful24 and were greatly feared by many people
in government. 25 The labor unions had abused their power in a number of ways which were very detrimental to the nation's economy.28
The most notable abuses of the labor unions were constant strikes,
racketeering and organized crime in labor organizations, violence at
strikes, discriminatory nature of unions and their membership, constant union craft conflicts, overuse of the secondary boycott and the
abuse of the closed shop principle.27
Congress came to the inevitable conclusion that something had
to be done to curb the strength of the labor unions.2 8 Consequently,
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act of 1947,29 commonly known as the Taft-Hartley amendments. The Taft-Hartley
20. The unfair labor practices of the employers are enumerated in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
21. Id.
22. See, A. Cox, D. Bok, & R. Gorman, supra note 8, at 10.
23. Seitz, Legal, Legislative, and ManagerialResponses to the Organizationof Supervisory Employees in the 1940's, 28 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 201 (1984).
24. See, A. Cox, D. Bok, & R. Gorman, supra note 8, at 91.
25. Id.
26. During the six years preceding the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery
Act of 1933, the United States had an average of 753 strikes per year, involving an average of
297,000 workers; during the next six years 2,541 strikes per year involving an average of
1,181,000 workers; and during the next five years through 1944-3,514 strikes per year involving an average of 1,508,000 workers. In 1945, approximately 38,000,000 days of labor were
lost as a result of strikes. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (1947).
The most notable of the strikes were two long stoppages by the United Mine Workers,
lead by John L. Lewis, which occurred during the Second World War, in direct defiance to the
government. A. Cox, D. Bok, & R. Gorman, supra note 8, at 91.
27. See, A. Cox, D. Bok, & R. Gorman, supra note 8, at 91.
28. See, H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st sess. 3.
29. 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
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amendments were a reversal of the government's attitude toward labor unions.3 0 The Taft-Hartley amendments still promulgated the
original policies of the NLRA, that is, the encouragement of collective bargaining and the betterment of labor-management relations.
In this respect, the Taft-Hartley amendments were consistent with
the NLRA. The marked difference in the government's attitude was
the realization that it could attain these policies without overly powerful labor unions .3 The Taft-Hartley amendments did not seek to
destroy the labor unions, but they did intend to curtail their immense
power and to stop their abuses which had an adverse effect on the
economy.3 2 The Taft-Hartley amendments were the result of a
strong lobbying effort by management and the government's desire
to halt the labor union's power.33 The Taft-Hartley amendments did
have its opposition. The amendments were bitterly opposed by labor
organizations who foresaw their power being stripped. Equally opposed were the congressional liberals who were dependent on the political support of the labor union membership.34 Even President Truman was opposed to the new amendments and vetoed them.
35
However, his veto was overriden by a determined Congress.
The policy statement of the Taft-Hartley Amendments found
fault with the labor unions.38 "Experience has ... demonstrated that
... practices by some labor organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods .... The
elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed. 37 The "elimination of such
30.

Wollett, supra note 13, at 210.

31.

Id. at 209.

32.

Id. at 232.

33. Seitz, supra note 23, at 202.
34.

A. Cox, D. Bok, & R. Gorman, supra note 8, at 89.

35. President Truman, in his state of the Union address on January 6, 1947, warned
that, "We must not, under the stress of emotion, endanger our American freedoms by taking

ill-considered action which will lead to results not anticipated or desired." H.R. No. 245 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1947). President Truman offered several alternatives to the sweeping leg-

islation of the Taft-Hartley Act. These alternatives were supported by the Senate Minority. Id.
at 66. Truman proposed legislation against specific ills of the labor unions, such as jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts. Id. The Department of Labor would have been given

more strength to assist freer collective bargaining. Id. Federal programs would have been established to assist workers and to alleviate their fear of management. Id. Finally, the President

would have urged the creation of a temporary joint commission to inquire into the field of
labor-management relations. Id. at 67. These alternatives were rejected by Congress. H.R.
Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1947).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
37. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4. (1947)
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practices" was done, in part, by listing unfair labor practices on the
part of labor unions.38 The right of the employees to organize and
form labor unions was now equal to the right of employees to refrain
from such activities.39 Labor unions, along with management, were
obligated to bargain collectively.4 More importantly, for our purposes, the amendments set forth the expressed exclusion of supervisors from the definition of employee41 and defined supervisory
status.42
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL UNDER THE NLRA AND THE TAFTHARTLEY AMENDMENTS

It was held in In Re Collieries"a that the NLRA included supervisors as employees and were entitled to the Act's protections and
rights.44 The Collieries decision was overruled one year later by In
Re Maryland Drydock and Local 31 of the Industrial Union of
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America,45 which excluded su-

pervisors from the scope of the NLRA. The Maryland Drydock decision was a product of lobbying pressures by labor management after Collieries.46 The matter was finally laid to rest in In Re Packard
For the past fourteen years, as a result of labor laws being ill-conceived and disastrously executed, the American working man has been deprived of his dignity as an
individual. He has been cajoled, coerced, intimidated, and on many occasions,
beaten up, in the name of the splendid aims set forth in section I of the National
Labor Relations Act. His whole economic life has been subject to the complete
domination and control of unregulated monopolists. He has on many occasions had
to pay them tribute to get a job. He has been forced into labor organizations against
his will. At other times when he has desired to join a particular labor organization
he has been prevented from doing so and forced to join another one. He has been
compelled to contribute to causes and candidates for public offices to which he was
opposed. Id.
38. The unfair labor practices on part of the labor unions are enumerated in 29 U.S.C.
158(b).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in § 8(a)(3). Id.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
42. See supra note 2 (setting forth the definition of supervisor under the NLRA).
43. 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942).
44. Id.
45. 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
46. Seitz, supra note 23, at 219-220.
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Motor Car Company and the FAA 47 which reversed Maryland Drydock. The Packard decision was a response to an industrial strike
created by supervisors at their exclusion of employee rights.4 8 The
PackardBoard decided it was in the best interest of the country to
include the supervisory personnel within the scope of the NLRA. 49
After the Collieries decision, supervisory labor unions began to
form. 50 Although supervisory labor unions already existed in some
industries," they were unions consisting primarily of basic floor supervisors. 52 The supervisors unionized because they perceived themselves as the forgotten man,53 the odd man out between the power of
the employer and the powerful employee unions." The supervisory
unions soon realized, however, that they needed the backing of the
powerful rank and file unions in order to effectively bargain with the
employer. 5 This combination would give the supervisors the leverage
they needed in negotiations with management."6 As a result, the su47. 61 N.L.R.B. 3 (1943).
48. The majority expressed in their opinion,
We would be remiss in our duty as public officials if we permitted our reluctance to
alter the existing rule to blind us to the effects of the powerful economic forces
which have manifested themselves since that rule was laid down ....The Nation
has not experienced the drastic consequences of extra-statutory organization by supervisory employees, and the duty of this Board has become plain. To continue to
deny such employees as a class the bargain right guaranteed by the Act would be to
ignore the clear economic facts and invite further industrial strife-a state of affairs
which the Nation can ill afford at this time and which the Act was designed to
mitigate. We are now convinced that the national interests will be better protected if
the organizational activities of foremen are conducted within, rather than without,
the framework of the collective bargaining statute. Id. at 20-21.
49. Id. It must be pointed out that the timing of the Packard decision was crucial. The
NLRB was well aware that World War 11was being waged and the full force of the country's
labor was needed without major strifes.
50. Seitz, supra note 23, at 200. The two major supervisory unions which formed were
in the mass production industries. They were the Foremen's Association of America ("FAA")
and the Mine Officials Union ("MOU"). These unions contrasted in operational philosophy.
The FAA attempted to form and be maintained independent of the rank and file unions. They
attempted to be a distinct and unique grouping of employees. The MOU, in contrast, wanted
to affiliate with the rank and file unions. It successfully did so in 1943 when it was received by
the United Mine Workers Union ("UMW"). Id.
51. Seitz, supra note 23, at 211. Many AFL unions and some CIO unions either permitted or required foremen and supervisors as members. Aside from these, there were about
twelve unions whose constituents were exclusively supervisors. For example, the printing, construction, and maritime industries traditionally unionized supervisors. The Railway Supervisors
Union was institutionalized by the Railway Labor Act of 1927. Id.
52. Seitz, supra note 23, at 200
53. Id. at 209.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 200.
56. Id.
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pervisory unions began to associate themselves more and more with
the rank and file.
The life of supervisory unions was short due to the passage of
the Taft-Hartley amendments and through the modernization of the
plant floor." As the plant floor became increasingly advanced
through technical innovation, the authority of the supervisors and
the need for their individual, unique methods decreased dramatically.58 The exclusion of the supervisors from NLRA protections was
the result of a major lobbying effort from labor management. 59 Labor management feared that the supervisors, backed by the powerful
rank and file unions, could take over the plant floor.6" Simply, the
more supervisors aligned themselves and identified themselves with
the rank and file, the less control the employer had over the production and management of his plant. Congress quickly recognized, with
the assistance of the lobby group, that the employer needed complete
loyalty from his supervisors in order to effectively control his plant.6 "
The organization of supervisors and the combined power of the rank
and file workers with supervisors contravened Congress' intention of
supervisory loyalty. Thus, supervisors were excluded from the scope
of the NLRA.62
Since the Taft-Hartley amendment had opposition,63 Congress
stressed additional reasons for excluding supervisors. Congress contended that union standardization would be unfair to supervisory
personnel due to their superior skill.6 ' Moreover, unionization would
inhibit the advancement of supervisors to higher management
levels.65 Congress, in an effort to cool the opposition, did not preclude the supervisors from unionizing.66 Supervisory personnel still
had the right to unionize but were not protected by the NLRA.67
57. Id. at 209.
58.

Id.

59. Id. at 202.
60. Id.
61.

H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947).

62. Id. at 14.
63. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
64. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., ist Sess. 17 (1947).
65. Daykin, The Status of Supervisory Employees Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 Iowa L. Rev. 313 (1943).
66. 29 U.S.C.. § 164 (1983).

Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization but no employer subject to this
Act shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employ-

ees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining. Id.
67. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 39 (1947). The Senate minority offered a
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The Senate minority was quick to state that the right to organize
under the NLRA was useless without the Act's protections.
In summary, the overall policy of the Taft-Hartley amendments
was to decrease the immense power of the labor unions. The supervisory exclusion policy of mandating loyalty to management' s was consistent with this overall policy because it decreased the power of the
labor unions on the plant floor.
THE ANAMAG TEAM LEADER

The Anamag plant utilizes the Japanese managerial system
called the "team concept". 69 The Anamag plant organizes its production employees into six teams.70 The team members elect a "team
leader" for an indefinite period of time.71 There are no management
restrictions as to who may be a team leader or how many times one
may be elected. 2 Team members are permitted to replace their team
leader at any time, for any reason, by a majority vote of the team.73
The team leaders serve solely at the discretion of the team members.7 4" Team leaders, as a whole, participate in managerial decisions
such as disciplinary actions against employees, 5 job and overtime
assignments, 8 hiring and recalling of employees, 7 and performance
efficiency appraisals.78 Although the team leader in the Japanese
team concept system seems to possess supervisory authority and
characteristics, the NLRB has excluded them from the rank of
supervisor.79
THE SUPERVISOR: DEFINITION AND CLARIFICATION

The status of the supervisor is essentially one of fact and the
courts have given the NLRB discretion in determining supervisory
very basic solution to the "loyalty" problem the majority rallied around. The supervisory per-

sonnel should be allowed to be members of unions with whom their employers did not bargain.
The supervisor would be able to remain loyal to his employer while being protected by the Act.

The Senate minority solution was based on fact. The building, printing, maritime and railroad
industries had used this scheme successfully before the Taft-Hartley amendments. Id. at 40.
68. Seitz, supra note 23, at 242.
69. See supra notes 4-5.
70.
71.

284 N.L.R.B. No. 72 at 3.
Id.

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.

77. Id.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 4.
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status.80 The courts have recognized the NLRB's expertise in this
area and will not reverse their decisions as long as there is substantial evidence to support the Board's findings, taking the record as a
whole."' The question of supervisory status reaches the NLRB in two
classic settings. First, the supervisory status question is raised when
the employer refuses to collectively bargain with the union because a
"supervisor" is being included within the bargaining unit.82 The second setting is one in which the union seeks to hold the employer
liable for an
unfair labor practice allegedly committed by a
"supervisor. ' ' ss
GENERAL SUPERVISORY POWERS

Although there are as many as thirteen powers listed in the
NLRA, it has been generally held that the statute is to be read in
the disjunctive, and that only one power will satisfy the authority
criteria of supervisory status.84 Supervisory status is only achieved if
one possesses actual authority to do any of the enumerated powers
listed.8 5 Thus, it was held in NLRB v. Southern Bleachery & Print
Works8 that an employer could not make a supervisor out of a rank
and file worker simply by giving the worker an official title.87 Although actual authority is required for supervisory status, this power
need not be direct. It may be actual authority directly or by some
chain of command. 88 Applying these principles, the Anamag Board
concluded that the "team leader" did not possess supervisory status." The Board stressed that supervisory authority was lacking
80. E.g., NLRB v. Swift and Co., 292 F.2d 561, 563 (Ist Cir. 1961).
81. E.g., NLRB v. Scott Paper Co., 440 F.2d 625, 628 (Ist Cir. 1971).
82. E.g., NLRB v. Parma Water Lifter Co., 211 F.2d 258, 260-261 (9th Cir. 1954).
83. E.g., Northern Va. Steel Co. v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 168, 169-172 (4th Cir. 1962).
Although the employer has total loyalty on the part of his supervisors, there is a price to pay.
As a result of this loyalty between the supervisor and his employer, the employer is responsible
for the actions of his supervisors. NLRB v. Kaiser Agricultural Chemicals, 473 F.2d 374, 381
(5th Cir. 1973). Any act on the part of any supervisor which adversely effects the collective
bargaining right of the employees, directly or indirectly, or gives management an advantage is
considered an unfair labor practice on the part of the employer. Daykin, supra note 65, at 304.
The employer is responsible for all supervisors, regardless of rank. Kaiser, 473 F.2d at 384. As
can be seen, the effect of supervisory status can be just as substantial upon the employer as it
can be to the individual himself. The supervisor and the employer may be personally effected
due to the acts of the other, all directly traceable to the determination of the worker as a
supervisor.
84. NLRB v. Quincy Steel Casting Co., 200 F.2d 293, 295 (1st Cir. 1952).
85. Id. at 296.
86. 257 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1958).
87. Id. at 239.
88. Mourning v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 768, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
89. 284 N.L.R.B. No. 72 at 4.
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since the "team leader" is largely preempted by the decision making
power of the team members who can remove the team leader at their
will. 90 In this respect, the Anamag decision was consistent with the
case law defining the "supervisor." However, this reasoning is inconsistent with the policies of the supervisory exclusion and the TaftHartley amendments.
The decision making power of the team members should have
been examined more extensively. If the team members have actual
authority, the supervisory exclusion policy, as well as the overall
Taft-Hartley policies, are defeated. When labor personnel has actual
authority over the plant floor, management's control dramatically
decreases. Team members' loyalty will still reside with their union
while being fully protected by NLRA due their "employee" status.
Strong control by labor, coupled with loyalty to unions and protection under the NLRA, could revive the labor union abuses discussed
earlier.
As stated above, a supervisor is one who has actual authority to
perform any one of the listed powers, but, who must receive such
authoritative mandates? Illinois State Journal Register v. NLRB9 1
held that a person must have actual authority over people who are
within the definition "employee" as expressed in the NLRA. 92 This
strict interpretation of the supervisory definition was made even narrower by Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB.93
In Westinghouse Electric Corp., Westinghouse manufactured
and serviced turbine generators and related equipment.9 4 They had
two basic installation and servicing contracts,9 5 one of which was
90. Id.
91. 412 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1969).
92. Id. at 44. Compare a vigorous dissenting opinion set forth in Mourning v. NLRB,
559 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The dissent argued that the term "supervisor" should not be
read in conjunction with the "employee" definition of the Act.
Primarily, since a "supervisor" is one having authority to direct "other employees", Congress intended a broad, everyday meaning to the term "employee" and did not intend to limit
the term to its definition under the Act. If it were otherwise, Congress would not have used the
word "other". The Illinois State Journal Register court answered this argument that "other
employees" refers to other workers of the same employer of the supervisor. It doesn't mean
other workers aside from the supervisor himself, therefore, the word "other" does not harm the
majority's position.
Secondly, the dissent posed a hypothetical company, which is layered, where a person may
be a supervisor without a definitional "employee" under him. This argument fails since supervisory authority need not be direct and may be in a chain of command. 559 F.2d at 770.
93. 424 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
94. Id. at 1153.
95. Id. at 1153-54.
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called the "technical supervision" contract. 96 Under this contract,
Westinghouse supplied material and equipment at specified prices
and the services of one or more Westinghouse engineers at an hourly
rate.9 7 The customer supplied all the "casual labor" at the installation site. 98 On larger projects, the customer also supplied foremen.
Westinghouse contended that their engineers assigned to the installation sites "supervised" the casual workers. 100 The Board and the
Court rejected this argument and decided, "[the fact that the people allegedly supervised are not Westinghouse employees prevents
the field engineers from being their supervisors within the meaning
of section 2(11) of the act. .

,,"o0 The Courts' interpretation of the

supervisor definition is consistent with the policy of excluding supervisors from the NLRA. The disjunctive reading of the enumerated
powers is broad enough to cover all those with specific authority.
Limiting the definition to authority over "employees" of the supervisor's employer illustrates that loyalty was only intended for those
who are closely aligned with the employer himself. Therefore, a
somewhat broad and narrow reading of different sections of the supervisory definition is perfectly consistent.
The supervisor -definition ends stating that one must use "independent judgment. ' 10 2 Therefore, one must possess at least one listed
power utilized with independent judgment to be classified as a super108
visor under the NLRA. In NLRB v. Island Film ProcessingCo.,
the Court stressed the statutory language of "if in the connection
with the foregoing," to determine that supervisory status is attained
only by the authority of any one power listed used in conjunction
with independent judgment. 04 However, the use of independent
judgment should not be confused with acts that are merely clerical
or routine.10 5 The use of independent judgment is not found because
a person has greater skill than those around him,106 or that they may
command other's respect,107 or that they may have greater responsi96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 1154.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1155.
102.
103.

See supra note 2.
784 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1986).

104. Id.at 1451.
105.
106.
107.

Quincy, 200 F.2d at 296.
NLRB v. Magnesium Casting Co., 427 F.2d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 1970).
Id.
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bility than others working with them."0 8
Applying these principles, the Anamag Board concluded that
the team leaders did not use independent judgment in their functions.' 0 9 The team vote or instructions from management precluded
the team leader from utilizing independent judgment in his duties."10
The Board concluded that the team leader's direction of workers was
merely routine because it directly corresponded to production requirements set by management."' The record showed that although
a team leader could request a team member to work on another machine, he did not have the authority to mandate such action.",2 In
this respect, the Anamag decision was consistent with the case law
defining the supervisor. However, the Board failed to address and
recognize the repercussions of their decision. It is the team leader
and his team members who control actual production on the plant
floor, even though production quotas are mandated by management.
This results in a plant floor controlled solely by the labor force, with
no person having mandated loyalty to management. Yet, these same
team members enjoy the protections of the NLRA since none are
classified as supervisors. It is this important aspect which is contrary
to the supervisory exclusion and the Taft-Hartley policies.
As stated earlier, one must possess actual authority, coupled
with the use of independent judgment to be classified as a supervisor.
The existence of supervisory authority must not be confused with the
exercise of supervisory authority. It is well established that the test
of supervisory power is the existence of authority and not the exercise of such authority." 3 Infrequent use of actual authority is considered irrelevant in determining the status of supervisor." 4 The only
relevance that the infrequent exercise of "authority" may have is to
refute the contention that the "authority" exists at all." 5 However, it
is agreed that once actual authority is proven, the frequency of its
use is irrelevant." 6
The above stated maxim has often been confused. In Goldies,
108.

E.g., NLRB v. First Union Management Inc., 777 F.2d 330, 335 (6th Cir. 1985).

109.

284 N.L.R.B. No. 72 at 5.

110.

Id.

I1l. Id.at 6.
112.

Id.

113. E.g., NLRB v. Harmon Indus., 565 F.2d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 1977).
114.

See, Southern Indiana Gas & Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 878, 884 (7th Cir.

1981).
115. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 237, 244 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
116. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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Inc. v.NLRB, 117 the First Circuit Court held that several Goldies'
counterpersons were not supervisors and thus entitled to NLRA protections.1 18 Goldies employed six countermen at the store in question.119 In general, they were responsible for selling automobile and
truck parts to customers.1 20 The countermen also took orders by telephone,1 21 showed merchandise,1 22 quoted prices,1 23 and answered
questions of customers.1 24 Two countermen had the authority to hire
and fire and were given supervisory status.1 25 The record showed that
all six countermen had the actual authority to issue oral and written
reprimands, although .only the two supervisors had actually issued
any.126 The Court held that the remaining four supervisors were not
supervisors under the NLRA.1 27 The Court affirmed the NLRB's
finding on the basis that the supervisory function of issuing reprimands was no more than "spasmodic and infrequent. 1 28 The Court
stated that spasmodic and infrequent use of supervisory authority
1 29
was insufficient to establish supervisory status under the NLRA.
Goldies cited NLRB v. Quincy Steel Casting Co.,230 NLRB v.
Leland-Gifford Co.,131 and Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l
Unions v. NLRB s2 as controlling. It is quite correct that Quincy,
Leland-Gifford, and Oil Workers stand for the proposition that spasmodic and infrequent use of supervisory power does not establish supervisory power, but these cases are factually distinct. These three
cases all dealt with rank and file employees replacing or "filling-in"
for supervisors for short periods. 3 The Goldies case dealt with per117.

628 F.2d 706 (ist Cir. 1980).

118.

Id.

119.

Id. at 708.

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

124.

Id.

125. Id. at 709.
126.

Id.

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130.
131.
132.
133.

200 F.2d 293 (Ist Cir. 1952).
200 F.2d 620 (Ist Cir. 1952).
445 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Quincy, 200 F.2d at 296; Leland-Gifford, 200 F.2d at 625; Oil, Chemical &

Atomic Workers, 445 F.2d at 241-242. Temporary or "fill-in" supervisors do not lose their
employee status automatically for acting with supervisory authority for short periods. The
Board and the courts closely examine the possibility of union control of management if the
temporary supervisors held their employee status intact. In cases where there is not a serious
threat to management, greater importance is given to the individual's right to protection under
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manent countermen who were not filling-in for a supervisor who had
actual authority.134 Quincy, Leland-Gifford and Oil Workers each
enunciate the rule that the mere existence of supervisory power is
sufficient to establish supervisory status. 135 The only time spasmodic
or infrequent use of supervisory authority does not establish supervi1 36
sory status is in the temporary or "fill-in" supervisor situation.
Using this principle, the Anamag Board concluded that supervisory status- should not be bestowed on the team leader because he
infrequently "filled-in" for "team advisors" who do have supervisory
status. 37 The Board did not cite the Goldies interpretation of current case law. However, a more complex problem presents itself. The
overall power of the team leader and his team cannot be overlooked.
As noted earlier, the team leader, along with his team, could effectively rule the plant floor while being protected by the NLRA. The
fact that "team advisors" are supervisors should not color the determination of the team leader. Given the team leaders' power, temporary assignments as "team advisor" could yield even more control.
This adds up to less control over the plant floor by management, a
direct contradiction of the Taft-Hartley policies.
SPECIFIC SUPERVISORY POWERS

Any of the powers listed in the statute which one has actual
authority to use with independent judgment is sufficient to establish
supervisory authority. Thus, the following powers are indicative of
supervisory status: authority to lay-off and recall,138 direct employees,139 transfer employees, 140 make pay raises and promotions,'4 1 and
the Act. This is perfectly consistent with the Congressional intent of promoting loyalty to

management. If there is no serious threat to management by the temporary supervisor being
included in the bargaining unit, then they would keep their employee status. The Board has
always approved the rank and file worker using "infrequent" or "spasmodic" supervisory au-

thority for short periods. In seasonal industries, rank and file workers who assume supervisory
status in peak seasons are not excluded from the Act's protections. Basically, a temporary
supervisor does not fall under the Act's "supervisor" definition as long as his temporary authority is not a regular and substantial part of his job. Moreover, his rank and file duties can
be sharply demarcated. GAF Corp. v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 492, 495-496 (5th Cir. 1975).
134. 628 F.2d at 708.
135. Quincy, 200 F.2d at 296; Leland-Gifford, 200 F.2d at 625; Oil, Chemical &

Atomic Workers, 445 F.2d at 244.
136.

GAF Corp. v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 492, 495-496 (5th Cir. 1975).

137. 284 N.L.R.B. No. 72 at 10.
138.

NLRB v. John Langenbacher Co., 398 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,

393 U.S. 1049 (1969).
139.
140.
141.

NLRB v. Charley Toppino & Sons, 332 F.2d 85, 86 (5th Cir. 1964).
NLRB v. Big Ben Dep't Stores, 396 F.2d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1968).
Charley Toppino & Sons, 332 F.2d at 86.
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to discipline employees." 2 The authority to hire and discharge employees also establishes supervisory status, 143 but does not include all
44
situations. In International Union Brewery Workers v. NLRB, it
was held that employees who hire and fire personal helpers, whom
the employees themselves pay, are not considered supervisors under
the Act. 45 The authority to assign work is also sufficient to establish
supervisory status, 46 but these assignments cannot be routine. In
NLRB v. City Yellow Cab Co., 14 7 the court ruled that the switchboard operators at a cab company who radioed driver pickup sites
were not supervisors since they merely routinely assigned work.148
The authority to suspend an employee is evidence of supervisory status, even if it exists only for one shift of work.14 9 The power to suspend has been held to exist even when higher authoritative personnel
made the final determination of suspension status.'
Utilizing the above principles, the Anamag Board concluded
that the team leaders were not supervisors.' 5' The Board stressed
that the team leaders are only involved in the hiring and recall procedure after a candidate has been approved by management.' 52
Team leaders are only used in the procedure to determine if the candidate would be compatible to the leader's particular team.' 5 ' This
does not bring supervisory status.5 The Board also concluded that
the team leaders do not "assign" overtime. 55 Team leaders needed
the vote of the team members to "assign" the overtime, therefore,
the leader was bound to his team's decision. 5 ' The Board also concluded that the team leaders did not discipline employees 5 17 or promote them.18 The team leader was limited to counseling employees
as to attendance related infractions and merely kept account of the
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

NLRB v. Ajax Tool Works, 713 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1983).
NLRB v. Big Three Indus., 602 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1979).
296 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
Id. at 303-304.
NLRB v. Dadco Fashions, Inc., 632 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1980).
344 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 581.
NLRB v. Gray Line Tours, 461 F.2d 763, 764 (9th Cir. 1972).

150.

Eastern Greyhound Lines v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1964).

151. 284 N.L.R.B. No. 72 at 8.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 9.
154. Kenosha News Publishing Corp., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (Sept. 29, 1982).
155. 284 N.L.R.B. No. 72 at 7.
156. Id.

157. Id. at 5.
158. Id. at 7.
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number of infractions in a clerical setting.159 As to promotions, the
team members collaborated as to employee performance appraisals
which would bring an advance in pay.160 Thus, the team leader did
not have an authoritative hand in the promotion process. 61 Therefore, the Board held that none of the above duties of the team leader
established supervisory status.
In this respect, the Anamag decision was consistent with the
case law defining the supervisor. However, the team leaders' function
cannot be minimized. The team leaders could effectively restrict the
use of management approved candidates by claiming that the candidate is not "compatible" with their team. Should each team member
concur, management is placed in the difficult situation of either discharging a candidate or creating a hostile environment on the plant
floor. Management is not likely to disturb plant harmony, and with
this knowledge, team leaders could effectively choose new candidates. Team members also vote on the assignment of overtime and
collaborate on employee appraisals. Collectively, these powers equate
to more control by the team leader and his team on the plant floor,
yet, management cannot mandate loyalty from any of them due to
the NLRA protections. Again, the policies of the supervisory exclusion and Taft-Hartley are defeated.
Although a person may not have actual, direct power to do any
of the above actions he may still be a supervisor. If a person has
actual authority to "effectively recommend" any of the above powers, they are considered supervisors under the act." 2 The term "effectively recommend" is considered a question of fact which is determined by the NLRB.'63 There has been some conflict as to the
meaning of "effectively recommend" among the Circuits. In Stop &
Shop Co. v. NLRB, 6 4 the plaintiff operated a chain of drug
stores.1 65 One pharmacist was designated the "pharmacy manager"
in each store.16 The pharmacy managers did not have direct authority to hire and discharge employees but they did play a significant
role in the process.' 67 The pharmacy managers completed perform159. Id. at 5.
160. Id. at 7.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Berry Schools v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir. 1980).
Stop & Shop Co. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 17, 18 (lst Cir. 1977).
548 F.2d 17 (Ist Cir. 1977).

165. Id. at 18.
166. Id.
167.

Id. at 19.
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ance review forms concerning each clerk. 16 8 These reviews played a
part in granting raises although there was evidence that raises were
given even without the pharmacy manager's knowledge. 169 The
Board ruled that the pharmacy managers were not supervisors.
The First Circuit reasoned that the pharmacy manager did not
"effectively" recommend any enumerated powers.17 0 "There was evidence that ...

the pharmacy manager's recommendations as to dis-

charge were sometimes ignored. By the principle of ejusdem generis,
in the phrase 'effectively to recommend', the emphasis is on the initial word.''7 The court's analysis is weak. The phrase "sometimes
ignored" implies that the pharmacy manager's recommendations
were sometimes used.
A better analysis is contained in Metropolitan Life Insurance. 72 The Court in Metropolitan Life concluded that the fact that
higher authorities review recommendations does not indicate that the
issuer of such recommendation is not a supervisor. 173 The power to
recommend implies review by higher authority. 74 If one, using independent judgment, has the authority to evaluate workers, which is
relative to promotions and pay raises, and they are used by higher
authority, they should be classified as supervisors. 7 5 Two years after
Stop & Shop, the same court decided NLRB v. JK Electronics'7"
which stated that "substantial" input satisfied the wording of "effectively to recommend" for supervisory status. 7
Using a combination of Stop & Shop, JK Electronics and Metropolitan Life Insurance, the Anamag Board concluded that team
leaders do not effectively recommend employee terminations or
transfers. The Board stressed that there was nothing in the record to
show that management's actions were a direct result of the team
leader's recommendations 78 or that these recommendations were accepted without an independent investigation by management.' 7" In
this respect, the Anamag decision was consistent with the case law
defining the supervisor. However, the fact that team leaders make
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 19.
Id.
405 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 1177.
Id.
Id.
592 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1979).
Id. at 7.
284 N.L.R.B. No. 72 at 5.
Id.
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recommendations at all, illustrates control over the plant floor. Although team leader recommendations are not accepted without independent investigation, the team leader can instigate investigations by
making such recommendations. This power could elicit the team
leader more support from team members who are aware that a team
leader's recommendation could lead to a promotion. This creates
more loyalty from team members to team leaders. This can lead to
tremendous control of the plant floor by team leaders, who would
continue to enjoy the protections of the NLRA. This is yet another
example of an instance in which the supervisory exclusion and TaftHartley policies are frustrated.
Finally, one may achieve supervisory status if one has authority
to adjust grievances."' This is distinguishable from someone who
merely presents grievances. It was held in InternationalLadies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB,18 ' that union representatives who
merely presented workers' grievances were not supervisors because
they had no authority to "adjust" those grievances. i 2 Using these
principles, the Anamag Board concluded that team leaders do not
adjust grievances. Although the team leaders could settle employee
conflicts, 83 higher management officials settled all "grievances"
which could not be settled among the team or by the team leader."'
Therefore, the team leader has no significant impact in the adjustment of grievances.
The Anamag reasoning concerning this aspect of the decision
was consistent with the case law defining the supervisor. However,
team leaders do have the authority to settle disputes among the
workers on the plant floor. This authority again gives the team leaders more power and control over the workers. More importantly, it
creates a stronger relationship with the team members. This could
allow the team leaders to effectively control the "goings and comings" of the plant floor, while still under the NLRA's protections.
This sharply decreases management's power over the plant floor and
frustrates the policy of having loyal supervisors on the plant floor.
Again, the policies of the supervisory exclusion and Taft-Hartley are
defeated.
It must be explained that the above study is not an exhaustive
one as to the determination of supervisory status. The Board and the
180. NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l, 477 F.2d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 1973).
181.
182.
183.
184.

339 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1964).
Id. at 121.
284 N.L.R.B. No. 72 at 8.
Id.
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courts consider several other factors not expressed above.1 85
CONCLUSIONS

The Anamag decision was consistent with the current case law
determining supervisory status. However, this case law does not effectuate the policies of the supervisory exclusion or the Taft-Hartley
amendments. This contradiction stems from the fact that the Japanese managerial philosophy and techniques are not consistent with
the basic premise of the NLRA. The policy excluding supervisors
from the scope of the NLRA was designed to regulate an adversarial
setting between labor and management. 180 The Japanese managerial
philosophy has labor and management working together, each performing functions traditionally performed by the other. Is it possible
to use the existing labor laws to regulate a system whose very essence was never imagined? If it is possible, should it be done?' 8" The
185. The following are by no means controlling to establish or refute supervisory status.
They are merely guiding points which may sway the Board one way or the other in their
factual determination of supervisory status. They are not taken alone on their faces but are
considered within the record as a whole. NLRB v. Scott Paper Co., 440 F.2d 625, 628 (Ist
Cir. 1971). The attendance of managerial conferences is usually indicative of supervisory status. Brewton Fashions, Inc. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 8, 12-14 (5th Cir. 1966). The approval of time
cards without any other authority supports the position that supervisory status is lacking. Oil,
Chemical & Atomic Workers, 445 F.2d at 243. An employee does not become a supervisor
merely because other workers regard him as such. Keener Rubber, Inc. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d
968, 970 (6th Cir. 1964). An employee is not a supervisor because he is paid at a higher rate
or by a different method than other employees. Filler Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 369,
375 (4th Cir. 1967). The size of a given unit is given much consideration in determining
supervisory status. If the size of a given unit is relatively small, it lends support to the proposition that the worker in question is probably not a supervisor. NLRB v. Imperial Bedding Co.,
519 F.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir. 1975). The converse is also true. The larger the given unit, the
more likely the worker in question is a supervisor. Silvercup Bakers, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 828
(1976). The wearing of distinctive clothing or uniforms indicates supervisory status. NLRB v.
American Casting Services, 365 F.2d 168, 171 (7th Cir. 1966).
There is one final point which must be briefly expressed. There were certain positions in
the workforce which Congress meant to include and exclude from the definition of the supervisor although they did not expressly do so. H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 35-36
(1947). These positions included strawbosses, leadmen, time study men, management officials
and confidential employees. In the cases of the leadmen and strawbosses it was believed by
Congress that these positions did not possess any real authoritative power. They merely gave
routine or clerical instructions for the convenience of efficient plant operation. Congress did not
expressly include confidential employees or management officials in the supervisor definition
because the Board always excluded these positions from the scope of the Act. Congress felt it
was unnecessary to expressly include them. H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36
(1947).
186. Schlossberg and Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management
Cooperation, 37 L.L. J. 595 (1986).
187. For a complete analysis outside the scope of this note, See Id.; See also Craver,
The NLRA at Fifty: From Youthful Exuberance to Middle Aged Complacency, 36 L.L.J. 604

(1985).
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consequences of inconsistent decisions regarding the supervisory sta-

tus of employees can have irreparable effects.' 88
There has been a tremendous rise in the use of labor-management cooperative plans in many industries throughout the United
States.""9 This increase in cooperative plans, along with the Japanese
managerial system which intertwines labor and management, may
bring an end to the NLRA. Some have either called for it or have at
least called for modification in current labor law to reflect the

change of managerial attitudes and philosophy.' The direction the
Courts and Congress may take remains to be seen.
The Anamag board recognized that the NLRA did not contemplate the Japanese managerial system.' 9 ' The NLRB is not Congress
and is bound by the current NLRA and case law. However, it is
clear that the case law does not effectuate the basic policies of the
supervisory exclusions and the Taft-Hartley amendments. This inconsistency must be corrected. Congress must re-evaluate the current NLRA and amend it accordingly.
Carmine E. Esposito

188. The determination of the worker as a supervisor denies him or her all rights and
privileges of the Act. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir.
1970). The employer unfair labor practices do not apply to acts against the supervisor and the
employer is under no legal duty to collectively bargain with his supervisors. Florida Power &
Light Co. v. International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 808 (1974). The employer is given a free hand in the discipline of his supervisors. GAF Corp., 524 F.2d at 495.
This principle was taken to the extreme when an employer was given the right to discharge a
supervisor, without liability, in the face of state "right to work" statutes. Beasley v. Food Fair,
416 U.S. 653 (1974). An employer may discharge a supervisor specifically for joining or engaging in union activity. Beasley, 416 U.S. at 656. It has been held that there is no such thing
as an unfair labor practice against a supervisor, but there are three exceptions which give the
supervisor slight protection. An employer's conduct violates the Act when (I) a supervisor is
disciplined for testifying before the Board or during the processing of an employee's grievance
(cite omitted); (2) a supervisor is disciplined for refusing to commit an unfair labor practice
(cite omitted); (3) where a supervisor who hired his own crew was discharged as a pretext for
terminating his pro-union crew (cite omitted). Automobile Salesmen Union v. NLRB, 711
F.2d 383, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
189. Schlossberg and Fetter, supra, at 595-596.
190. Id. at 615. See also Craver, supra, at 615.
191. 284 N.L.R.B. No. 72 at 2.
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